Earlier this month, I was in Beijing for an "International Workshop on Legalizing Center/Local Relations." At the conference and in separate discussions with government leaders, businessmen and reporters, there was alarm about growing domestic unrest.

A few years ago, China began to release annual figures of social unrest incidents. The first year, the number was 48,000. Last year, it had increased to 95,000.

There has been a tacit social contract in China. The people will put up with the shortcomings of one-party rule if the system delivers the benefits of rapid economic growth. But problems of dislocation and inequity are growing while the benefits primarily remain limited to the coastal regions.

The great economic disparity between inland areas and the coastal regions are known by the 950 million people left behind. One-hundred-fifty million workers have left their families to move to squalid conditions on the outskirts of coastal cities.

In rural areas, housing, education and health care are inferior. Provincial officials are appointed by the center. To gain promotion they must industrialize. Local officials are taking farmers' land for little or no compensation to give to developers. The farmers are desperate.

The center cannot turn off the economic engine. China's foreign policy will be dominated by the need to secure energy and other raw materials to fuel economic growth. China can try to shift investment from exports to domestic consumption and push it inward. That may buy time.

Environmental problems are rising. The short-term imperative of economic growth trumps the long-term benefits of mitigation.

There are other forces for change. The media create greater awareness of disparities. The Internet, while censored, nonetheless flourishes. China's market economy empowers individuals and individual initiatives. Practices and habits developed there are not easily contained elsewhere, and growing numbers of Chinese elite, including younger government officials, are better educated, have broader exposure and want change.

High-profile anti-corruption cases will be brought. But they will be episodic and inconsistent and be seen primarily as political retribution.

In the near term, the Communist Party will remain the most powerful thing in China. Leaders will address dissent within the party with favors, but that has limits. The Communist Party will push the "ideology of stability." It will promote "self-reflection" and harmony. There will be censorship and intimidation.

Will change come? One-party rule lacks legitimacy. Without elections, political data are imperfect, there is no outlet for opposing views, and, like communist rule elsewhere, the system is brittle. You need the rule of law to adjudicate conflicts in a fair, transparent and acceptable manner.

Will change come soon? Probably not. As Professor Mao Shoulong observed at the Beijing conference: "If the rules are not well-defined, the people behind the stage are very powerful. If [they are] well-defined, the people on the field are strong."

In China, the people behind the curtain will hold onto their power tenaciously. Domestic unrest will continue to rise. But reform will come.

Chicago lawyer Richard S. Williamson is former U.S. ambassador at the U.N.

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